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[Crim. No. 5648. In Bank. Mar. 15, 1955.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. JACK SYKES, Appellant. 
[1] Crimina.! Law-Evidence-Other Crimes-Plan or Scheme.-
Generally, evidence to show plan or scheme concerns means 
used to gain end, such as theft of pistol before attack on 
person. 
[2] Poisons-Furnishing Narcotics to Minor-Evidence.-In pros-
ecution for furnishing marijuana to minor in violation of 
Health & Safe Code, § 11714, testimony that minor had been 
recruited as prostitute by defendant, while involving use of 
ends to prove means, is relevant to prove motive regardless 
of whether it is admissible to show plan or scheme. 
[3] Criminal Law-Evidence-Other Crimes-When Admissible.-
Test for admissibility of evidence is whether it tends logically, 
naturally and by reasonable inference to establish any fact 
material for the People, or to overcome any material matter 
sought to be proved by defense, and if so it is admissible 
regardless of whether it embraces commission of another crime 
or whether other crime be similar in kind or part of single 
design. 
[4] Poisons-Furnishing Narcotics to Minor-Evidence.-In pros-
ecution for furnishing marijuana to minor, motive is material 
fact, and evidence of prosecutrix' relationship with defendant 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Drugs and Druggists, § 36 et seq. 
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 136 et seq.; Am.Jur., Evidence, 
§ 310 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 393,9); [2, 4, 6] 
Poisons, § 14; [3] Criminal Law, § 393(1); [5, 8] Poisons, § 16.1; 
[7] Witnesses, § 120(2); [9] Witnesses, §§ 244,260; [10] Criminal 
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in connection with prostitution and sharing of its proceeds 
with him is admissible as bearing on his motive in giving 
marijuana to her without receiving payment. 
[6] Id.-Furnishing Narcotics to Minor-Appeal.-In prosecution 
for furnishing marijuana to minor, failure of defendant to 
object to testimony that he gave prosecutrix second opportunity 
to smoke marijuana cigarette on night following one on which 
crime charged was alleged to have been committed precludes 
him from complaining on appeal that he was prejudiced. 
[6] Id.-Furnishing Narcotics to Minor-Evidence.-In prosecu-
tion for furnishing marijuana to minor, evidence of similar 
conduct of defendant ,,:ith same person who is named in 
indictment is admissible to show disposition of defendant to 
commit act charged and probability of his having committed it. 
[7] Witnesses-Cross-examination-Defendants in Criminal Cases. 
-Where defendant is charged with giving narcotics to minor 
and repeatedly denies in broad terms commIssion of crime, 
he may be asked on cross-examination if he ever had narcotics 
in his possession, evidence of possession of narcotics at prior 
times being admissible to show familiarity with them. 
[8] Poisons-Furnishing Narcotics to Minor-Appeal.-In prosecu-
tion for furnishing marijuana to minor, admission of testimony 
by third person that he stole heroin from defendant was 
harmless where only effect such evidence could have against 
defendant was to show previous possession of narcotics by 
him, and where such possession had been admitted by him in 
previous testimony. 
[9] Witnesses-Impeachment-Inconsistent Statements-Laying 
Foundation.-Police officer and prosecuting attorney cannot be 
asked about prior inconsistent statements of witness until 
foundation questions have been asked of witness (Code Civ. 
Proc., § 2052), and if he admits inconsistent statements it is 
error to introduce other evidence of them. 
[10] Criminal Law-Appeal-Harmless Error-Witnesses-Im-
peachment.-In prosecution for furnishing marijuana to minor, 
where witness was asked on cross-examination by defendant's 
counsel if he wished to explain why he had stated to prosecut-
ing attorney that he had given marijuana cigarette to defendant 
or minor, and witness then related events leading to his plea 
of guilty, attempting to show that such statement was part 
of transaction in which he was induced to plead guilty to 
charge of furnishing marijuana to minor in order to escape 
prosecution on other charges, defendant is precluded from 
complaining on appeal that he was prejudiced by such witness 
being asked whether he had pleaded guilty to such charge. 
[11] Id.-Appeal-Objections-Argument of Counsel.-Failure to 
object to statements of district attorney dUl'ing his ar~ent 
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or to request instruction to jury to disregard argument consti-
tutes waiver of objection to challenged statements, and mis-
conduct, if any, will not warrant reversal. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the 
City and County of San Francisco. Melvin I. Cronin, Judge. 
Affirmed. 
Prosecution for furnishing marijuana to minor in violation 
of Health & Safe Code, § 11714. Judgment of conviction 
affirmed. 
Sol A. Abrams and George E. Hammer for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn, 
Assistant Attorney General, and Raymond M. Momboisse, 
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent. 
EDMONDS, J.-The appeal of Jack Sykes, who with Rudy 
Mercado, was indicted for furnishing marijuana to Beverly 
Detrick, a minor, is from the judgment of conviction of the 
crime of violating section 11714 of the Health and Safety 
Code. 
Beverly Detrick, 17 years of age, testified that while she 
was sitting in a cafe, Sykes entered, took a marijuana ciga-
rette from his pocket, and handed it to Mercado. After 
Mercado lighted the cigarette, he handed it to Beverly. She 
smoked it and gave it back to Mercado who returned it to 
Sykes. Sykes smoked it and then passed it back to Mercado, 
who again smoked it before passing it on to the others seated 
ai'ound the booth. It was then returned to Sykes. Beverly 
testified that while the cigarette was being passed around, 
Mercado and Sykes were saying, "Keep it down so no one can 
see it." 
Beverly further testified that on the following evening, 
while riding in a taxicab driven by Sykes, he handed her 
another marijuana cigarette. This, she said, was in the 
presence of a perSOll named lilrank or Eddie. When cross-
examined she testified that Jesus Gonzales, whom she knew 
as Frank Cruz, was not present on either occasion. Upon 
redirect examination she declared that Jesus Gonzales was 
the man in the taxicab who gave her the cigarette. Gonzales 
denied knowing Beverly at the time she said he was with her. 
Beverly testified that she was introduced to Sykes some-
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was living at the time. Over objection, Beverly testified at 
great length that she had been recruited as a prostitute by 
Sykes, to whom she paid one-half of her income. She further 
testified that they had discussed the rates she should charge 
and how to detect venereal disease. He took her to hotels 
and suggested false names for her to use in registering. 
Other testimony by Beverly was that she had smoked mari-
juana cigarettes 28 or 29 times previous to the evening 
Sykes offered one to her. She described the cigarette offered 
to her. She was familiar with the odor of marijuana, she 
said, and smoking the cigarette that night made her feel 
U a little high." Beverly said that she had never paid any 
money to Sykes for marijuana. 
Inspector Maloney, a qualified expert on narcotics, testified 
that her actions and terminology were typical of one who had 
smoked a marijuana cigarette and her description of mari-
juana was correct. The method of smoking described by 
Beverly, the inspector said, was typical as well as the practice 
of passing of the cigarette from one person to another. 
Mercado's testimony was that Sykes did not give him a 
marijuana cigarette at the cafe. The prosecution claimed sur-
prise and asked to impeach the witness. Over objection, 
Mercado was asked if he had not pleaded guilty to the crime 
charged in the indictment. The district attorney also ques-
tioned him about the circumstances surrounding the plea 
and prior inconsistent statements made at that time. In 
answer to other questions over objection, Mercado admitted 
the theft of some heroin from Sykes and the previous pos-
session of narcotics. 
Sykes contends that the court erred in admitting Beverly's 
testimony about her conduct as a prostitute under the direc-
tion of Sykes and also her charge that he gave her a ciga-
rette on the night after they were in the cafe. The testi-
mony of Sykes on cross-examination as to his previous pos-
session of narcotics and the admission of Mercado that he 
had stolen narcotics from Sykes is also said to justify re-
versal of the judgment of conviction. Another contention 
is that the district attorney made prejudicial remarks to the 
jury during his opening and closing arguments by repeated 
reference to the alleged pimping and narcotic activities of 
Sykes. The prosecution failed to prove all of the elements 
of the crime charged, he says, and the evidence is not sufficient 
to support the convictiop.. 
--... -------~---.~-- .. -.-.-----.---~.-... -------------.... --,-..... ""'-.,-> ..... ~-~-
-) 
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The attorney-general argues that the testimony by Beverly 
and the crocs-examination of Sykes insofar as they touched 
on prostitution was admissible to show the plan, scheme or 
motive of Sykes. As such it is, the state asserts, an excep-
tion to the general rule that evidence of other crimes or 
immoral conduct is not admissible. 
The theory of the prosecution is that Sykes carried on 
a complete plan to subjugate the mind and body of Beverly 
to his vile ends. [1] Generally, evidence to show a plan or 
scheme concerns the means used to gain an end, such as the 
theft of a pistol before an attack upon a person. [2] Here, 
the district attorney used the ends to prove the means. It 
is not necessary to decide whether such evidence shows plan 
or scheme, because it was relevant to prove motive. [3] The 
test for admissibility is: "does it tend logically, naturally, 
and by reasonable inference, to establish any fact material 
for the people, or to overcome any material matter sought to 
be proved by the defense' If it does, then it is admissible, 
whether it embraces the commission of another crime or does 
not, whether the other crime be similar in kind or not, whether 
it be part of a single design or not." (People v. Peete, 28 
Ca1.2d 306, 315 [169 P.2d 924]; also see: People v. Dabb, 
32 Cal.2d 491 [197 P.2d 1] ; People v. James, 65 Cal.App.2d 
709, 710 [151 P.2d 572].) 
[4] Motive is a material fact. Evidence was offered that 
Beverly at no time paid Sykes for any narcotic. There is 
reason to believe that he was motivated in giving it to 
her because of their relationship in connection with prosti-
tution and the sharing of its proceeds with him. EVidence of 
this relationship with her was, therefore, admissible. 
[5] No objection was made to the testimony of Beverly 
that Sykes gave her a second opportunity to smoke a mari-
juana cigarette on the night following the one on which 
the crime charged was alleged to have been committed. On 
cross-examination, a vigorous attack was made on this testi-
mony. Having failed to object, Sykes cannot now complain 
that he was prejudiced. [6] Moreover, in cases based upon 
the commission of certain types of crimes, evidence of similar 
conduct of the defendant with the same person who is named 
in the information or indictment "is admissible to show the 
disposition of the defendant to commit the act charged and 
the probability of his having committed it." (People v. 
Jewett, 84 Ca1.App.2d 276. 279 [190 P.2d 330] and cases 
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for sex crimes, and upon a charge of pimping. (People v. 
Bellamy, 79 Cal.App. 160 [248 P. 1042].) The reasons for 
applying that rule where the charge is furnishing narcotics 
to a minor are just as compelling as in sex cases. 
[7] Upon cross-examination of Sykes it was proper to ask 
if he had ever had narcotics in his possession. Sykes was 
charged with giving narcotics to Beverly. Previously Sykes 
had repeatedly denied in broad terms the commission of the 
crime. In such circumstances, the permissible scope of cross-
examination is very wide. (People v. Zerillo, 36 Ca1.2d 222, 
229 [223 P.2d 223].) The evidence that at prior times he had 
narcotics in his possession was admissible to show familiarity 
with them. 
[8] It is contended that the testimony which brought out 
the admission by Mercado of the theft of heroin from Sykes 
was highly prejudicial. But, the only effect such evidence 
could have had on the case against Sykes was to show the 
previous possession of narcotics by him. As such possession 
had already been admitted by Sykes in previous testimony, 
the admission of Mercado's statement on this point was harm. 
less. (People v. Cohen, 94 Cal.App.2d 451, 456 [210 P.2d 
911] ; People v. Booth, 72 Cal.App. 160, 166 [236 P. 987].) 
Upon direct examination Mercado was asked, "Did Jack 
Sykes ever furnish you with marijuana '" Mercado replied, 
"No, sir." Claiming that he was surprised by this reply the 
district attorney asked leave to impeach the witness. An 
objection upon the grounds that Mercado was the prosecu-
tion's own witness was overruled, the trial judge stating that 
he might be impeached if surprise were shown and a founda-
tion laid for that purpose. Mercado then was asked if he 
had pleaded guilty, in a joint indictment with Sykes, to a 
charge of giving narcotics to Beverly. He replied that he 
had. He further explained that he had been arrested in 
another state, brought to California by a police officer, and 
interrogated by the prosecuting attorney before entering the 
plea of guilty. Mercado testified that he told both of these 
men that Sykes had given him a marijuana cigarette which 
he had passed on to Beverly. But he told the police officer 
this, he said, because he had a grievance against Sykes 
and was lying when he made the same statement to the 
prosecuting attorney. The only objection to any of these 
questions was that one of them had already been asked and 
answered. This objection was overruled. 
Sykes admits that the prosecution was entitled to impeach 
) 
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Mercado but argues that the method of doing so was im-
proper. He contends that by these questions the prosecution 
was permitted to draw the admission from Mercado that he 
had pleaded guilty and thus impeached his credibility by 
showing bad character. He asserts that the police officer and 
the prosecuting attorney were both available to give testimony 
as to the prior inconsistent sti'l.tements. 
The party producing a wit ness is not allowed to im· 
peach his credibility by evidence of bad character, but it 
may be shown that he has made prior statements inconsistent 
with his present testimony. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2049.) 
" [B] ut before this can be done the statements must be 
related to him, with the circumstances of times, places, and 
persons present, and he must be asked whether he made such 
statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. . • ." (Code 
Civ. Proc., § 2052.) [9] The officer and the prosecuting 
attorney could not be asked about the prior statements until 
the foundation questions had been asked of Mercado. Once 
he admitted the inconsistent statements, it would have been 
error to introduce other evidence of them (See: People v. 
Pianezzi, 42 Cal.App.2d 265, 272 [108 P.2d 732].) 
It is unnecessary to decide whether the question re-
garding the guilty plea was properly a part of the founda-
tion for impeaching Mercado. If it were error, it could have 
been remedied by an admonition to the jury to disregard it. 
However, no objection to the question was made. [10] On 
the contrary, on cross·examination by counsel for Sykes, Mer-
cado was asked if he wished to explain why he had stated to 
the prosecuting attorney that he had given a marijuana ciga-
rette to Sykes or Beverly. Mercado then related at length 
the events leading to the entry of his plea of guilty, attempt-
ing to show that this statement was part of the transaction in 
which he was induced to plead guilty to the charge of fur-
nishing marijuana to Beverly in order to escape prosecution 
upon two other charges. In these circumstances, Sykes can-
not now complain that he was prejudiced. 
[11] S'yk(~s complains of assertedly prejudicial remarks of 
the district attorney in his opening and closing arguments. 
Without determining whether the references to pimping and 
narcotics were improper, they do not constitute grounds for 
reversal. "No objection was made to the argument. It was 
not assigned as miscomluct. The court was not requested to 
instruct the jury to disregard it. Under these circumstances 
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(case cited) and the misconduct if any will not warrant 
reversal." (People v. Jones, 91 Cal.App.2d 501 [205 P.2d 
437]; also see People v. Hunter, 49 Cal.App.2d 243 [121 
P.2d 529] ; People v.Lew, 78 Ca1.App.2d 175 [177 P.2d 60].) 
Other points made by Sykes concern the asserted lack of 
proof of the corpus delicti, and the insufficiency of the evi-
dence to support the conviction. The testimony of Beverly, 
if believed, is ample to prove the elements of the crime charged 
and fully supports the judgment of conviction. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
SCHA DER, J., Dissenting.-In my view the opinion pre-
pared for the District Court of Appeal by Presiding Justice 
Peters and concurred in by Justices Bray and Wood (Fred B.) 
(reported in (Ca1.App.) 273 P.2d 588) adequately discusses 
and correctly resolves all issues of law presented on this appeal. 
For the reasons therein stated it is my conclusion that the 
defendant was deprived of a fair trial and that the judgment 
of conviction should be reversed. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. Defendant was jointly indicted 
with Rudy Mercado on one count of furnishing marijuana to 
Beverly Detrick, a minor. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11714.) 
Mercado pleaded guilty, and defendant was convicted after 
a trial before a jury. Beverly testified that defendant shared 
one marijuana cigarette with her and others present on the 
occasion on which the indictment was based and that he 
shared another cigarette with her and another person a night 
or two later. She did not pay defendant for the puffs she 
took from his cigarettes. Defendant admitted that he knew 
Beverly but denied that he had ever given her any marijuana 
or shared any marijuana cigarettes with her. Thus the only 
issue in the case was whether or not defendant shared his 
cigarette with Beverly on the first occasion mentioned above. 
To prove its case, the prosecution was permitted to introduce 
evidence over defendant's objection that a few days before the 
date of the alleged crime, defendant had discussed prostitution 
with Beverly and other girls and that during the next two 
weeks she had engaged in prostitution for defendant on 12 
occasions. Defendant secured the customers for her and 
shared the proceeds with her. He did not supply her with 
marijuana or discuss marijuana on any of the occasions when 
ae took her iQ ~ for purposes of prostitati<& 
) 
) 
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It is my opinion that this evidence that defendant was pimp. 
ing for Beverly was not admissible to prove that he shared 
his cigarette with her and could serve only to prejudice the 
jury against him and induce them to convict him, not because 
he was guilty of the crime for which he was on trial, but be· 
cause he was a pimp.· 
Although the rule with respect to the admission of evidence 
of crimes other than the one charged in a criminal prose cu· 
tion has frequently been stated as one generally excluding evi· 
dence of other crimes subject to certain recognized exceptions 
(see People v. Albertson, 23 Ca1.2d 550, 576 [145 P.2d 7]), it 
is now" settled in this state that except when it shows merely 
criminal disposition, evidence which tends logically and by 
reasonable inference to establish any fact material for the 
prosecution, or to overcome any material fact sought to be 
proved by. the defense, is admissible although it may connect 
the accused with an offense not included in the charge." 
(People v. Woods, 35 Cal.2d 504,509 [218 P.2d 981] ; see also 
American Law Institute, Model Code of Evidence § 311; Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, 
Uniform Rules of Evidence, rule 55; Stone, Exclusion of Simi-
lar Fact Evidence, 46 fIarv.L.Rev. 954 and 51 Harv.L.Rev. 
988.) In the application of this test, however, the reasons for 
the exclusionary rule must not be forgotten; there must be 
care to avoid unnecessary prejudice to the defendant. Evi-
dence that defendant has committed other crimes is excluded 
as proof of his criminal disposition for the same reasons that 
other evidence of his criminal character is excluded. "The 
inquiry is not rejected because character is irrelevant; on the 
contrary it is said to weigh too much with the jury and to so 
overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general 
record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a 
particular charge. The overriding policy of excluding such 
evidence, despite its admitted probative value, is the practical 
experience that its disallowance tends to prevent confusion of 
the issues, unfair surprise and undue prejudice." (Jackson, 
J., in Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-476 [69 
8.Ct. 213, 93 L.Ed. 168].) "The common law has not grown 
in the tradition of convicting a man and sending him to prison 
because he is generally a bad man or generally regarded as 
one. General bad character, much less general bad reputa· 
·Since no objection was made to the evidence that defendant shared a 
marijuana cigarette with Beverly on another occasion, it is unnecessary to 
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tion, has not yet become a criminal offense in our scheme. Our 
whole tradition is that a man can be punished by criminal 
sanctions only for specific acts defined beforehand to be crimi-
nal, not for general misconduct or bearing a reputation for 
such misconduct." (Rutledge, J., dissenting in Michelson v. 
United States, supra, 335 U.S. at p. 489.) The pr~judicial 
effect of evidence of other crimes lends support to the view 
that even when such evidence is directly relevant to the proof 
of a material fact, the trial court should have discretion to 
exclude it when its relevance is negligible as compared with 
its prejudicial effect and other proof of the issue is at hand. 
"This is a situation where the policy of protecting a defendant 
from undue prejudice conflicts with the rule of logical rele-
vance, and a proper determination as to which should prevail 
rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, and not merely 
on whether the evidence comes within certain categories which 
constitute exceptions to the rule of exclusion." (State v. 
Goebel, 36 Wn.2d 367 [218 P.2d 300. 306] ; see also Adkins v. 
Brett, 184 Cal. 252, 258-259 [193 P. 251] ; Stone, Exclusion 
of Similar Fact Evidence, 46 Harv.L.Rev. 954, 984-985; Mc-
Cormick on Evidence, § 157, pp. 332-333.) In any event 
the court" should be guided by the rule that such proof is to 
be received with 'extreme caution,' and if its connection with 
the crime charged is not clearly perceived, the doubt is to be 
resolved in favor of the accused, instead of suffering the minds 
of the jurors to be prejudiced by an independent fact, carry-
ing with it no proper evidence of the particular guilt." (People 
v. Albertson, 23 Ca1.2d 550, 577 [145 P.2d 7] ; see also People 
v. Peete, 28 Ca1.2d 306, 316 [169 P.2d 924] ; People v. Lane, 
100 Cal. 379, 387-390 [34 P. 856]; People v. Carvalho, 112 
Cal.App.2d 482, 492 [2"16 P.2d 950].) 
The basic question is whether defendant's pimping is 
relevant to prove only his criminal disposition or also rele-
vant to prove facts material to the prosecution's case. For 
the reasons stated above, failure of the challenged evidence 
to emerge as clearly relevant compels resolution of the ques-
tion in defendant's favor. 
The attorney general contends that the evidence was rele-
vant on the ground that it was defendant's scheme to reduce 
Beverly to drug addiction so that he might dominate her com-
pletely as a prostitute. The majority opinion does not pass 
on the validity of this contention. Instead, it moves on to 
the conclusion that the evidence of pimping was relevant to 
IIhow defendant's motive for sharing his cigarette with 
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Beverly. The issue of defendant's motive, however, cannot 
be so divorced from the contention that both crimes were part 
of a common plan or scheme since, in the absence of proof 
of such a plan or scheme, there is no logical basis in the 
evidence for inferring that defendant's motive in sharing 
his cigarette with Beverly was explained by the fact that he 
was pimping for her. 
It is always possible that two distinct crimes committed 
by a defendant are part of a common scheme or that one 
provides or illuminates the motive for the other. Were there 
evidence in this case that defendant had carried out a plan 
to subjugate Beverly to his will as a prostitute by reducing 
her to dope addiction, it could reasonably be inferred that 
his initial acts of pimping and providing marijuana were part 
of that plan and that the desire to carry it through was the 
motive for each of the crimes that it involved. The record is 
barren of such evidence; it presents two apparently unrelated 
courses of criminal conduct. It is for the prosecution to 
supply the missing links; if it fails to do so, evidence con-
ditionally admitted should be struck from the record. (People 
v. Frank, 28 Cal. 507, 518-519; People v. lVhiteman, 114 Cal. 
338, 343 [46 P. 99]; People v. Wright, 144 Cal. 161, 165-
166 [77 P. 877]; People v. Darby, 64 Cal.App.2d 25, 31 
(148 P.2d 28] ; State v. Goebel, 36 Wn.2d 367 [218 P.2d 300, 
306] ; see also Boyer v. United States, 132 F.2d 12, 13 [76 
App.D.C. 397] ; 2 Wigmore on Evidence [3d ed.] § 304, p. 
205; 6 Ibid. § 1871, p. 505; Trautman, Logical or Legal Rele-
vancy, 5 Vand.L.Rev. 385, 409.) Else prejudicial evidence 
would be freely admitted, not for its relevance apart from 
defendant's criminal disposition, but for the possibility of its 
relevance to show more than the defendant's criminal dis-
position. What then becomes of the rule excluding evidence 
that bears only on criminal disposition' 
If the facts of the case in the light of human experience 
do not make it reasonable to infer that one crime is evidence 
of the motlve for another, evidence of the one is not ad-
missible to prove the other. Thus, if a defendant were charged 
with the murder of a woman's husband, proof of his adulterous 
relation with the woman would be relevant to show the de-
fendant's motive for killing the husband. But if the evi-
dence showed only that he was committing adultery with a 
woman who was not his victim's wife, it would not be reason-
able to infer that it was relevant evidence of the motive for 
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shown that the woman's husband had desarted her and that 
she had become the mistress of the defendant's victim. In 
such conlleeting evidence is relevance rooted, not in the drift-
ing sands of speculative possibilities. 
Had the prosecution established the elements of the scheme 
it contends existed, it would have established the relevance 
of the pimping as part of that scheme and defendant's motive 
for giving Beverly marijuana. In the absence of such con-
necting evidence, however, there is no reasonable basis for 
inferring that defendant's motive ill sharing his eigarette 
with Beverly was the fact that he was pimping for her. 
Defendant '8 motive might have been to carry out the scheme 
the prosecution did not prove existed; it might have been 
no more than to share the enjoyment of the cigarette with 
others present as the prosecution expert testified marijuana 
smokers are wont to do; it might have been not to waste the 
cigarette, for many users apparently do not like to smoke a 
whole cigarette at once; conceivably it might have been to 
reward Beverly for acting as a lookout at a bank robbery or 
assisting him in the commission of some other crime; con-
ceivably also it might have been to secure Beverly as a cus-
tomer who would purchase narcotics from him in the future. 
There is a host of possibilities. 
Except for its relevance in proving defendant '8 criminal 
disposition, the evidence of defendant's pimping is a neutral 
quantity neither adding to nor subtracting from the prosecu-
tion's case, and since it was clearly prejudicial, its admission 
should compel reversal of the judgment. 
Carter, J., concurred. 
